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ABSTRACT
A key decision in the development of high assurance
software is that of choosing a formal methods tool. This
paper describes a methodology to select a formal methods
tool for use in the development of high assurance software.
Some of the factors that make a tool suitable to the task can
be evaluated with a desk check, while others can only be
appreciated by “hands on” testing. We describe the
application of our methodology to a broad set of currently
available formal methods tools, including a hands-on
evaluation of one of the tools. The impact of the tools on
the project development is also discussed.
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1 INTRODUCTION
A distinguishing feature of high assurance systems is that
they are modeled mathematically using formal methods.
This modeling enables formal reasoning about the system
design, that can be used to prove that the system has certain
properties.  The model also assists in the verification of the
code since all code must be shown to be an instance of a
part of the model.
A key consideration in the design of high assurance
systems is the choice of the software used to assist in the
formal modeling.  The question arises as to how to choose a
tool to assist in the formal methods and on what factors
should that decision be based.  This paper describes an
effort to identify discriminators that will allow practitioners
to find the best fit of formal tools for a project.
Statement of Need
There are over a dozen freely available formal method tools
that that can assist with formal methods of software design.
Many of these were compared in an initial survey.  The
survey included ACL2, AutoFOCUS, Coq, Elf/Twelf,
IMPS, HOL, Isabelle, Nuprl, Otter, PVS, SpecWare, STeP,
TAME, TPS, Maude, Vienna and Z/Eves.
This study [7] was conducted at the Center for INFOSEC
Studies and Research (CISR) at the Naval Postgraduate
School, as part of the TCX project. [4] The goal of this
project is to develop a high assurance separation kernel that
can be evaluated under the Common Criteria at EAL-7. It is
the hope of CISR that the code and supporting development
documentation can be used as a concrete example for
others in the development of high assurance systems.  This
project will be done using a spiral development method.
Thus the need was for a tool that would assist in the
expression and validation of security properties.  This tool
must be easily obtainable and freely available so that
reviewers can understand the role of formal methods in the
development of high assurance systems.
2 METHODOLOGY
We developed a two-phase methodology for evaluating
formal methods tools.  The first phase is to conduct a desk
check of the tools against a set of functional criteria or
requirements.  These requirements are used to determine a
smaller set of tools that can be compared in-depth.  The
second phase, the in-depth evaluation, is to conduct a
hands-on trial of the remaining tools. Each tool is used to
specify and prove the security characteristics of a simple
security model.
Evaluation Criteria
Before the evaluation began, a list of criteria was identified
to evaluate the tools.  While developing the set of criteria, it
became apparent that some of the criteria could only be
evaluated by using the tool.  These criteria would be the
basis for evaluation during the “hand’s on” phase.   Table 1
summarizes the criteria used to evaluate the tools and the
phases in which the criteria were examined.
3 SURVEY PHASE
A large effort was undertaken to compare the tools against
the criteria.  In the course of conducting the survey, we
found that several of the criteria were more effective in
distinguishing among the tools.
Some of the criteria appeared useful in establishing
minimum functional requirements, but proved to be of
little, if any, value in discriminating one tool from another,
since all of the surveyed tools met these basic standards.
For example, Resource Requirements and Implementation
Language did not prove useful in reducing our tool set. All
of the tools evaluated ran on at least one of the popular
operating systems and used a well-known and common
implementation language.
Factors that were useful in discriminating one tool from
another in the survey phase were further divided into
primary and secondary groups. The primary discriminators
are Support, Maturity, Expressiveness and Purpose; the
remaining factors are deemed “secondary.”  The rational
for this division was that, since our project was focused on
developing very high assurance software, the correctness of
the proofs was paramount and therefore it would be unwise
to choose an immature tool that had not been thoroughly
scrutinized for potential errors in its internal logic.  Since
the ultimate purpose of the TCX project was not to
advertise a tool, but rather to construct software, the
availability of supporting documentation was critical.
Expressiveness was desirable to support the maintainability
of the specifications and the mapping of them to actual
code.  Finally, we sought tools that were developed as
general-purpose theorem provers since they were the most
flexible and imposed the fewest restrictions on
development.
Survey Conclusions
Out of the sixteen tools surveyed, two were selected for an
in-depth analysis for their suitability to our project.  The
two tools were ACL2 and PVS.  A comparison of the two
tools follows in Table 2.
4 HANDS ON PHASE
One of the major goals of the TCX project is to show, with
high assurance, how an abstract security policy is
implemented in the software and hardware.   To achieve
this, we plan to use the following approach:
A model of the security policy is created using a
formal specification language. At this level, the
model is checked for internal consistency and for
its ability to capture the salient properties of the
security policy. The model of the security policy
then is “refined” to capture more details of the
implementation. This refinement is often called an
FTLS (Formal Top Level Specification). The
refinement should be expressible in the terms of
the specification language, there should be support
for the mapping between the refined specification
and the security policy and there should be support
for proving that the refined specification is
consistent with the security policy and does not
implement anything that would “violate” the
properties of the model.
Having narrowed down the field of tools, it is possible to
begin using the tools to determine their applicability to the
project. For the tool to support our approach, it should be
Evaluation Criteria Qualifications
Maturity Ideal tool should be mature enough to be trusted, and actively supported.
Documentation Ideal tool should have a large body of resources and documentation.
Purpose Tool must be able to reason about security properties.  Examples of using the tool in
a software development process must exist.
Implementation Language Ideal tool will use a language to describe the model that is portable and “well
known” with ample documentation
Resource Requirements Tool should run on either Windows or a version of Unix (Linux, Solaris, OS X.).
Ideal tool will work on multiple platforms.
Expressiveness Tool must be able to express software properties and be able to prove that the
specification meets those properties.
User Interface Ideal tool should not require the memorization of a large body of commands.  A
simple GUI is preferred.
Consistency of
Specification
Logic of the tool must be shown to be consistent.  Tool must guarantee that a









Executable Specification Ideal tool should allow a specification to be executed to demonstrate certain cases
and allow the developer to gain an interactive “feel” for the program
Multiple Levels of
Abstraction
Tool must support a “top down” design process where a specification can become
less abstract.  Tool must support inter-level mapping or some other way of














User Friendliness Ideal tool should be useable without first acquiring a detailed understanding of the
mechanics of the tool.
Table 1: Evaluation Criteria
able to provide the mappings between the security model
and the FTLS.
Approach
The model we used is a simplified instance of the Bell and
LaPadula Model [1].  The top level represents the Security
Policy, and the second is a Formal Top-Level Specification.
The security policy describes a hypothetical state machine
with some basic state transitions.  Within the machine there
are subjects (actors that use or manipulate data) and objects
(representing the data itself).  Every subject and every
object had an associated security label.  These labels do not
change and are ordered so that label a  b, implies that a is
more sensitive than b.  A real world example would be the
U.S. military labels Secret and TopSecret where TopSecret
 Secret.  In plain English, the security policy states that a
subject cannot read an object unless the subject’s security
label is greater-than or equal-to the security label of the
object.  Similarly, a subject can only write to an object if
the subject’s security label is equal to the security label of
the object.
The fundamental security property is that that the system is
in a secure state if and only if subjects can only access
objects in accordance with the policy described above.  The
security theorem we need to prove is that if the system
starts in a secure state and only makes transitions according
to our restrictions then it will always be in a secure state.
This policy was chosen because it is well known, simple
enough that it can be proven easily and has enough
elements in it to provide a glimpse as to how well the tool
would support a more complicated policy.
The Security Policy states very few details about the
machine, subjects, objects, security labels or transitions.
The second level of the model, the Formal Top-Level
Specification describes some of these in more detail. The
Formal Top-Level Specification represents a particular
implementation of the security policy.  The FTLS shows
the actions of the system including inputs, outputs and
effects (including errors).  In the FTLS, we assign more
concrete descriptions to the elements of our policy.
Subjects, for example, are described as processes, while
objects are represented as memory blocks.
Implementation of the Model
We implemented the two-level model in PVS.  PVS is a
Criteria ACL2
Adapted Common LISP 2
PVS
Prototype Verification System
Maturity Editors Kaufmann and Moore.  Current
version 2.7 released in 2002.  First version
developed in 1994.  Based on the Boyer
Moore Theorem Prover that dates to the
1970’s.
Developed by SRI International
Current version 3.1 released in 2003.  First
version developed in 1992.
Support Since ACL2 is a subset of Common LISP,
there is extensive supporting documentation
available
One of the oldest and best documented of the
theorem provers that is in use today.
Expressiveness Blends arithmetic decision procedures with
rewriting techniques.  Uses first-order
quantifier-free logic.  Has Powerful type-
like mechanism called “guards” that can be
used to ensure functions are well typed.
Logic is quantifier free semi-automatic and
uses lemmas as guidance.  [3]
Supports classic higher-order logic with
functions, sets records, tuples, predicate sub-
types, dependent typing and theories.  Axioms
may be introduced freely.  Allows concise and
natural specifications as well as the ability to











Purpose General purpose theorem prover General purpose theorem prover
User Interface Emacs Emacs with X window tools.
Consistency of
Specifications
Yes, through built-in interactive “proof
checker” [3]
Yes, Automated consistency checking of
specifications.  Type checking system that











Yes, unless there exist undefined functions. No
Resource
Requirements
Any environment that supports one of the
standard Common Lisp Implementations,
Unix, Linux, Windows, etc.
Sparc machines with Solaris 2 or greater and
x86 machines with Linux distributions






Untyped Common Lisp Allegro Common Lisp (Commercial Version of
the Language)
Table 2: Candidate Tools for In-Depth Evaluation
type-theoretic specification language. An element is of a
specific type if it satisfies some condition (for example a
being may be of type Human if it walks on two legs and
does not have fur).  Type theory is similar to set theory in
many respects but differs primarily in the sense that two
sets are considered equal if every element is identical,
whereas stating the types of two elements are equal says
nothing about elements themselves but does describe their
structure [2].  A SubType is a type with additional
constraints imposed on the type (For example a Type Man
may be described as a predicate subtype of Human that
meets the additional predicate male(x)).  Within PVS and
other type-theoretic proof checking systems, checking that
types are used appropriately becomes an important
obligation in the overall proof (for example, assuming a
proof exists that being a Man implies being mortal, proving
that Socrates is mortal is reduces to proving that Socrates
was of type Man).  For our two level model, the primary
challenge of the inter-level mapping was type-checking that
the appropriate FTLS elements were a sub-type of the
Security Policy elements.
PVS provides three important features that were key to the
development of the specification: TYPE+, Sequences and
IMPORTING.  The TYPE+ notation indicates that an
abstract type is non-empty, with no additional constraints
on it.  Sequences are a type in PVS, and are used to talk
about series of events for inputs or outputs.  The
IMPORTING clause allows the use of theories from other
(presumably higher level) specifications.  Our
implementation made use of all of these items.  After much
work, we were able to successfully implement our model
and prove the security properties.  A summary of the
elements and their mapping is shown in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Intra-Level Mapping
Evaluation of the PVS Implementation of the Model
After specification and proof of the model, we were able to
draw several conclusions about PVS.  The first was that the
specification could be written concisely.  The use of higher
order logic and the type system enabled a specification that
followed the original model closely and was
comprehensible by a human reader.  As is usual in any
system that has “strong” typing, it took a considerable
amount of effort to ensure that the various types had the
appropriate relationships with each other. The automated
type checking and the verification system were very useful
in identifying when there were mismatches and validating
the final results. For example, the type checking system
generated several proof obligations that were missed in the
initial construction of the specification; such as the fact that
Read _ Write and that Memory could not be empty.
One problem that was encountered was the use of the
IMPORTING clause.  PVS currently does not allow
embedded assumptions in the importing parameter list.
This prevented automated generation and proving of some
of the Type-Checking obligations. Therefore the
assumptions at the Policy had to be repeated at the FTLS
level. This made the FTLS proof more complicated and
reduced the benefits of the layering.
Evaluation of ACL2
ACL2 is a subset of common LISP.  The goal in the
construction of ACL2 was to retain the power of LISP
while removing the commands that introduced side
effects that could harm the integrity of proofs[5].  It
can be used not just as a specification or modeling
language but also as a programming language.  ACL2
is based on set theory, however it attempts to derive
some of the benefits of a type-based system through
the concept of guards.  A guard prevents a function
from accepting a parameter unless it meets a
condition.
We have yet to implement the
demonstration security model and
FTLS in ACL2. We will be able to do
a more complete analysis after that has
been completed.  It appears that since
ACL2 is not strongly typed, it  may
require more effort than PVS to
express the same concepts.  A
simplified proof process may offset
this additional effort[8].  Finally,
ACL2’s logic provides several
automatic proof techniques.  The style
of these proofs is very robust and
dramatic changes to the specification
may not imply a dramatic change to the proof.
5 CONCLUSIONS
The selection of a formal methods tool is an important
decision in the development of a high assurance system.
We have defined a useful methodology for the assessment
of formal methods tools.  Included in this methodology is a
set of evaluation criteria, or requirements.  Several factors
must be considered including the system’s maturity,
Subject
Formal Top Level Specification
























support, expressiveness and multi-level mapping.  While
several tools may meet the general requirements,
differences in the foundational logic will greatly shape how
the specification is developed, how the theories are proved
and how the specifications are layered, and will thus effect
the overall assessment of a given tool.
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